English Colonial Propaganda Debunked: How Every European Personal Union Exposes the Scotland & England 'Union of Crowns' as Disinformation, Not History. What Remains Is the 1707 Annexation the English Colonial State Cannot Justify in International Law
Still Yours For Scotland | decolonise.scot
If you are a Scot active on social media and exercising your internationally recognised right to self-determination under international law (a right now formally before the Secretary-General of the United Nations through document UN Human Rights Council A/HRC/61/NGO/210) you will know what comes next. If you are not a Scot, welcome. What follows is a masterclass in how colonial disinformation operates in plain sight, how a state maintains a colonial relationship in the twenty-first century not through force but through the systematic falsification of constitutional history, and why the English colonial state needs you, the international community, the historical friends and allies of Scotland, the global left, the UN system, the international legal order, not to look too closely at 1707. The English colonial propaganda machine has its coordinated online propaganda networks and ideological amplification systems (bots, cyber armies and brigades), its genuine colonial unionists and their online digital activism, and its useful idiots. They deploy a rotating set of talking points designed not to engage with Scotland's constitutional reality but to bury it under historical disinformation. One of their favourites, endlessly recycled with colonial confidence, and historically illiterate from its first word to its last, is the claim that in 1603, when James VI of Scotland inherited the English throne and became James I of England, the two crowns somehow became one crown, and that this supposed fusion of crowns constituted a union of the two kingdoms. The "Union of Crowns." One king, therefore one crown, therefore one country, therefore Scottish independence a contradiction in terms.
Every element of this is false. In 1603, one man inherited two crowns. Those two crowns did not become one crown. The Crown of Scotland remained the Crown of Scotland (in existence until today); conditional, contractual, held in trust by the sovereign Scottish people under the constitutional tradition that would be expressed definitively in the Claim of Right Act of 1689. The Crown of England remained the Crown of England; sovereign through the doctrine of the Crown-in-Parliament, vesting ultimate authority in the monarch, Lords, and Commons acting together, operating under an entirely different and irreconcilable constitutional theory. Two crowns. Two kingdoms. Two constitutional orders. Two sovereign peoples. One man wearing both crowns simultaneously did not fuse them, merge them, or extinguish either one. It never does and never did. Anywhere in European history.
The further colonial disinformation step, from "one crown" to "one nation", is the foundation of the 1707 annexation's retrospective legitimation. If the two crowns had already become one in 1603, the 1706-1707 Treaty and Acts of Union appear as the administrative completion of something constitutionally already accomplished. If the two crowns remained two crowns; as they demonstrably and legally did, as the entire constitutional history of the period from 1603 to 1707 confirms beyond any serious dispute; then 1707 is exposed as what it was: a colonial annexation, procured through coercion and bribery, of a sovereign nation whose distinct constitutional order the English colonial state required to eliminate precisely because it had never been extinguished by the personal union of 1603. This is why the 1603 myth is indispensable to the colonial position. This is why we aim to help demolish it.
The English colonial propaganda bots, the unionist cyber brigades, the professional intelligence operatives and the genuine colonial believers flood social media with it and deploy it in reply to every assertion of Scottish self-determination; targeting Scottish activists, drowning out constitutional debate, and attempting to make the colonised people feel that their own history contradicts their own liberation. They state it with the confidence of people who have never examined it, who have never needed to examine it, because the colonial epistemic framework they inhabit makes it feel like common sense rather than what it is: colonial disinformation whose relationship to European constitutional history is one of total, documented, proven, and devastating incompatibility. What makes the claim remarkable is not merely its historical inaccuracy but its complete incompatibility with the constitutional history of Europe itself. The proposition that a shared monarch automatically fuses two distinct crowns into one, and thereby extinguishes distinct sovereignty and constitutional existence, is contradicted by virtually every major dynastic union in European history. The "union of crowns" narrative therefore functions less as historical analysis than as a colonial mythology designed retrospectively to naturalise Scotland's colonial annexation into the English-dominated British state; as Robert Black KC puts it, a "takeover"; by making it appear as the inevitable constitutional completion of something that had already occurred a century earlier. It had not.
Let us examine it and follow this logic wherever it leads; because where it leads is absurd and frankly embarrassing for anyone deploying it in public; and once you see what it requires you to believe about the rest of European history, impossible to take seriously for another moment.
Dozens of Nations Shared Monarchs and Remained Entirely Different Nations. Every Single Time.
Dynastic union and political union were historically distinct constitutional phenomena. European monarchs accumulated crowns continuously across the medieval and early modern periods without thereby dissolving the separate legal systems, sovereignties, representative institutions, and political identities attached to those crowns. The conflation of personal union with constitutional merger; the claim that sharing a monarch fused two crowns into one and thereby merged or lead to merging two nations; is therefore not a historical principle. It is a selectively applied colonial fiction used almost exclusively against Scotland.
Denmark, Norway, and England shared a king; and remained Denmark, Norway, and England, each with its own distinct crown.
Known to English schoolchildren as the king who famously failed to hold back the tide, Cnut was simultaneously King of England, King of Denmark, and King of Norway from 1028. Three crowns. One man. By the "shared monarch means merged crowns means merged nations" logic, England, Denmark, and Norway became one country with one crown in 1028. Brexit was therefore a Scandinavian country leaving the European Union. The Danish and Norwegian governments have not been informed of this. The English, Danish, and Norwegian peoples remained entirely distinct throughout and after Cnut's reign, with entirely distinct languages, laws, identities, and sovereign traditions. Nobody, not a single historian in the thousand years since, has argued that England's crown merged with Denmark's or Norway's crown in 1028 because of a shared king. Because sharing a king does not merge crowns and does not merge nations. It never has. Anywhere. Shared monarchy altered dynastic geography. It did not fuse crowns, dissolve sovereignties, or extinguish national existence (Bolton, 2017).
Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, Naples, and Sicily shared a king; and remained Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, Naples, and Sicily, each with its own distinct crown.
Charles I of Spain was simultaneously Holy Roman Emperor Charles V; a Habsburg archduke born in Ghent whose first language was French and who had never set foot in Spain before inheriting its throne. Under him, an enormous collection of territories across Europe shared a single monarch: Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, Naples, Sicily, large parts of the Holy Roman Empire. Did their crowns merge? Did they become one nation? Did the Dutch become Spanish? Did the Neapolitans become Austrian? Did the Austrians become Sicilian? They did not. They remained entirely distinct peoples under a shared ruler, with separate crowns, separate parliaments, separate laws, separate armies, separate languages, and separate identities. The Spanish Inquisition did not operate in Vienna. The Dutch did not answer to the Castilian Cortes. They shared a monarch. Their crowns remained distinct. They remained different nations. No historian treats these dynastic arrangements as fusions of crowns or mergers of nations, any more than Scotland's crown ceased to be Scotland's crown after 1603 (Elliott, 2002). The Habsburg composite monarchy is particularly important because historians of early modern Europe routinely distinguish between dynastic aggregation and constitutional incorporation. The crowns accumulated by Charles V did not fuse into a single sovereign entity merely because one ruler held them simultaneously. Scotland and England after 1603 operated under precisely the same constitutional logic.
Poland and Sweden shared a king; and then fought each other for a century to make the point absolutely clear.
Sigismund III Vasa was simultaneously King of Poland-Lithuania and King of Sweden from 1592 to 1599. By the shared monarch logic, the two crowns merged and Poland and Sweden became one country. They did not. They remained fiercely distinct sovereign states with fiercely distinct crowns, and subsequently fought multiple devastating wars against each other across the seventeenth century (the Deluge, the Great Northern War) in which hundreds of thousands died. If sharing a monarch had merged their crowns and extinguished their separate sovereignty, the subsequent conflicts between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden would need to be interpreted not as interstate wars but as internal conflicts within a single polity. A proposition no serious historian accepts. They were not civil wars. They were wars between two entirely distinct nations with two entirely distinct crowns who had shared a king for seven years and remained, stubbornly and bloodily, entirely different sovereign peoples before, during, and after (Davies, 2005). Exactly as Scotland and England did after 1603; except Scotland, unlike Poland, did not need to fight a war to prove it, because the constitutional reality was already unambiguous.
England and France shared rulers; and then fought the Hundred Years War to clarify the situation.
William the Conqueror was Duke of Normandy when he became King of England in 1066, making him simultaneously the ruler of a major French duchy and the King of England. By the 'shared ruler means merged crowns means merged nations' logic, England and Normandy merged in 1066. Subsequently, English kings accumulated further French territories and titles across the following centuries; the Angevin empire under Henry II stretched across half of France, and English kings eventually claimed the French crown itself during the Hundred Years War, ruling simultaneously as King of England and claimant King of France. By the propagandists' logic, this would make the Hundred Years War, in which England and France fought each other ferociously across a century while English kings simultaneously claimed to be kings of France, the most elaborate and expensive civil war in history. A nation fighting itself for a hundred years. Joan of Arc, who marched into Orléans to the sound of bagpipes in 1429 accompanied by a guard of around 60 Scottish men-at-arms and Scottish archers (DeVries, 1999), part of the thousands of Scottish soldiers fighting for France under the Auld Alliance (Caldwell, 1998; Vale, 1974), whom Pope Martin V is said to have described as "a well-known antidote to the English" (Nicholson, 1974), a phrase encapsulating Scotland's long historical role in constraining English continental ambitions, was not a national liberation hero. She was a rebel against her own government. This is not what the French believe and not what history records. Because shared rulers do not merge crowns and do not merge nations. England and France remained different nations with different crowns throughout their shared royal connections, their intertwined dynasties, and their century of war (Allmand, 1988). Medieval and early modern Europe was structured around overlapping dynastic claims that rarely corresponded neatly to political sovereignty. The existence of shared rulers or competing hereditary claims never fused the separate crowns or erased the separate constitutional existence of kingdoms themselves. Exactly as Scotland and England did after 1603.
England and the Netherlands shared a king; and the Anglo-Dutch Wars somehow happened anyway.
William III of Orange, the Dutch Stadtholder who became King of England in 1689 in what the English call the Glorious Revolution, was Dutch. By the bloodline-and-crown logic, England's crown and the Netherlands' crown merged in 1689. This would make the four Anglo-Dutch Wars, in which England and the Netherlands fought each other ferociously across the seventeenth century; including wars fought in the years immediately before William took the English throne; the most self-destructive conflict in European history. A nation repeatedly going to war with itself over trade routes. The Dutch and English did not consider themselves the same nation or their crowns the same crown during these wars. They were not the same nation. Their crowns were not the same crown. They shared a king for a period. Their crowns remained entirely distinct. They remained entirely distinct sovereign nations throughout (Israel, 1995). Exactly as Scotland and England did after 1603.
Portugal and Spain shared a king for sixty years; and Portugal remained Portugal, with its own distinct crown throughout.
When Philip II of Spain claimed and secured the Portuguese throne in 1580, through both dynastic right and military intervention, Portugal and Spain shared a monarch for sixty years (the Iberian Union) before Portugal restored its independence in 1640. During those sixty years, Portugal retained its own Crown, its own Parliament, its own laws, its own colonies (in our case there were only English colonies since Scotland has never had a colonial empire), its own identity, and its own fierce sense of distinct nationhood. When the union ended, nobody argued that Portugal's crown had merged with Spain's during the sixty years of shared monarchy, or that its restored independence was a contradiction in terms. Portugal's crown had been Portugal's crown throughout. The shared king changed nothing about what that crown was or whose sovereignty it represented (Disney, 2009). Exactly as Scotland's crown remained Scotland's crown after 1603; and exactly as Scottish independence is not a contradiction in terms but the restoration of what colonial domination suppressed.
England is German. Has been since 1714. Nobody noticed.
Charles III descends primarily from the House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, a German dynasty so conspicuously German that George V changed the family name to Windsor in 1917 during World War One specifically to hide it. By the "shared monarch means merged crowns means merged nations" logic, England's crown merged with Germany's and England became Germany in 1714 when George I ascended the English throne. He spoke almost no English, had spent virtually no time in England before becoming its king, conducted government primarily in French and Latin, with German his native tongue, and remained Elector of Hanover, dying on a trip back there in 1727 and buried in Germany, not in England. England is therefore Germany. Westminster is the German Parliament. Brexit was Germany leaving the European Union.
The German affiliation did not stop there. The family was so conspicuously German that George V changed the name to Windsor in 1917 specifically to disguise it. The German connections proved stubbornly persistent. Edward VIII abdicated in 1936, toured Nazi Germany in October 1937 with his wife Wallis Simpson, met Adolf Hitler at his Berchtesgaden retreat, and gave Nazi salutes during inspections of SS troops. He wrote Hitler a personal thank-you letter in German ("To the Führer and Chancellor, the Duchess of Windsor and I would like to thank you sincerely") and was described by Hitler himself as a firm friend whose continued presence on the throne would have strengthened Anglo-German relations permanently. Intelligence reports and German, Spanish, and Russian documents show members of the British royal family were far closer to Nazi Germany than has previously been recognised. The "Windsor Files" (sixty pages of documents discovered by American troops at Marburg Castle in 1945 among 400 tons of captured Nazi Foreign Ministry archives) provided documented evidence of the Duke of Windsor's relationship with high-ranking Nazi officials. The Anglo-British government, deeply embarrassed, attempted to suppress them. By the propagandists' own logic, England's crown merged with Germany's in 1714 and the evidence suggests some members of that German dynasty took the connection rather seriously. Taken seriously, the same logic would imply constitutional transformations that nobody accepts in any other European context. The absurdity of such conclusions exposes the selective and politically instrumental character of the argument when directed against Scotland. Does any of this follow? No. Because a monarch's bloodline and title do not merge crowns and do not transfer sovereignty between nations. Everyone knows this; except, with remarkable and revealing selectivity, when the argument is deployed against Scotland (Simms and Riotte, 2007).
What Actually Happened in 1603; and What Did Not
James VI of Scotland inherited the English throne through his great-grandmother Margaret Tudor. He moved to London and took the English throne. He became James I of England. Scotland remained Scotland; entirely, geographically, constitutionally, and sovereignly distinct, its own crown intact, its own constitutional order undisturbed, its own sovereign people unmerged with any other. Scotland kept its own Parliament, its own legal system, its own church, its own coinage, its own foreign policy (although always under English colonial pressure), its own constitutional tradition in which the people, not the Crown, were sovereign, forming the community of the realm. One man now wore two crowns. Those two crowns did not become one crown. Two kingdoms did not become one kingdom. Two constitutional orders did not merge. Two sovereign peoples did not become one people. The Crown of Scotland: conditional, contractual, revocable, held in trust by the sovereign Scottish people; remained the Crown of Scotland. The Crown of England remained the Crown of England; sovereign through the doctrine of the Crown-in-Parliament, vesting ultimate authority in the monarch, Lords, and Commons acting together, operating under an entirely distinct and irreconcilable English constitutional theory of parliamentary sovereignty. The personal union changed the identity of the person wearing each crown. It changed nothing about what each crown was, what constitutional order it represented, or what sovereign people it belonged to.
This is not a partisan interpretation. It is what contemporaries understood at the time. It is also what James himself and the English Parliament understood; explicitly stated. Recognising that no union of crowns into one, and therefore no union of nations, had occurred in 1603, James himself immediately set about trying to create one, spending the first years of his English reign attempting to persuade the English Parliament to legislate for a full incorporating union. Between 1604 and 1607, the English Parliament rebuffed him comprehensively, citing legal objections, constitutional obstacles, and outright anti-Scottish hostility and Scotophobia. As the History of Parliament Online records, Christopher Pigott MP, sitting for Buckinghamshire, delivered an "invective speech" against the Scots in February 1607, describing them as murderers, thieves, and rogues, whose words were passed over "without Tax or Censure" until the king himself protested, at which point Pigott was expelled from the House and committed to the Tower (Thrush, 2014). The English Parliament's rejection of James's union project is the most devastating single piece of evidence against the 1603 myth. If the two crowns had already fused into one in 1603, and Scotland and England had truly become one nation, James would not have spent the next four years attempting to persuade the English Parliament to legislate for a full political and parliamentary incorporating union. What had occurred in 1603 was that one man wore two entirely separate crowns, the Crown of Scotland and the Crown of England, two constitutionally distinct objects operating under two entirely incompatible theories of sovereignty, neither of which absorbed or extinguished the other. The crowns had not merged. The nations had not merged. The union of two crowns into one had not occurred. Two crowns remained two crowns. James knew it. The English Parliament and the Scottish Parliament knew it. The propagandists are the only ones who do not or who need you to believe they do not.
The "union of crowns" narrative performs what decolonial theory identifies as a classic colonial function; transforming a historically contingent structure of colonial domination into an apparently natural and inevitable political reality. Colonial mythology works not by inventing history entirely but by reorganising historical memory in ways that render incorporation, constitutional suppression, annexation and asymmetrical power retrospectively consensual and historically inevitable. The two nations continued as distinct sovereign states with distinct crowns, sharing only a monarch, for another 104 years; exactly as Denmark, Norway, and England had shared Cnut while retaining their distinct crowns; Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands had shared Charles V while retaining their distinct crowns; Poland and Sweden had shared Sigismund III while retaining their distinct crowns.
What happened in 1603 was a personal union: one individual inheriting two entirely separate crowns operating within two distinct constitutional systems. Nothing resembling a fusion of crowns, a union of states, a merger of sovereignties, or an incorporation of political authority took place. Personal union was among the most common constitutional arrangements in pre-modern Europe. What distinguished full constitutional incorporation was not shared monarchy but the transfer, absorption, or abolition of sovereign institutions and constitutional authority. That transfer did not occur in 1603. Scotland retained its own Parliament, legal system, church, fiscal structures, and constitutional traditions for more than a century afterward. The personal union altered dynastic succession. It did not fuse Scotland's crown with England's crown. It did not extinguish Scotland's separate constitutional existence. The two kingdoms maintained entirely separate material existences throughout. Scotland had its own pound Scots trading at a floating rate against sterling; customs duties were levied on goods crossing the Tweed (this was international trade, not internal trade); on land the English flew St George's Cross and the Scots flew the Saltire. Two separate nations, two separate flags, two separate currencies, two separate legal systems, two separate sovereignties, two separate crowns (Angry Pict, 2026).
Four Proofs That Demolish the 1603 Myth: The Constitutional Scholarship of Sara Salyers and the Angry Pict
The constitutional evidence demolishing the 1603 myth is assembled here mostly from two bodies of analysis that are equally foundational: Sara Salyers's constitutional scholarship through Salvo; the deepest available analysis of the Claim of Right, Scottish popular sovereignty, and the conditionality of the Scottish Crown; and the Angry Pict's historical analysis of the 1603 personal union and its constitutional consequences. Together they establish four conclusions whose logical force is unanswerable.
First: 1689. Scotland removed its monarch constitutionally, not through the military coup that England required and then dressed up as a "Glorious Revolution", but through the activation of Scotland's own distinct constitutional principle. As Sara Salyers establishes in her foundational analysis of the Claim of Right, the Scottish Crown was conditional, the monarch ruled by contract, and breach of contract voided title (Salyers, "The Claim of Right," Salvo). As the Claim of Right Act 1689 makes explicit, James VII "did assume the Regall power and acted as King without ever taking the oath required by law"; the oath through which the sovereign Scottish people invested the monarch with the Crown conditionally and revocably. James VII was judged by the Convention of the Estates to have forfeited the Crown by breaching those conditions. This was the Scottish constitution operating exactly as designed not improvisation. A polity capable of removing its monarch through its own distinct constitutional mechanisms; operating under its own distinct theory of sovereignty, through its own distinct constitutional institutions, under its own distinct Claim of Right; almost a century after 1603 plainly retained its own distinct crown and its own distinct constitutional order. The Crown of Scotland remained alive, conditional, distinct, and constitutionally separate from the Crown of England. The personal union of 1603 did not fuse the two crowns. It left intact a separate Scottish constitutional order, with a separate Scottish crown, whose suppression required the entirely distinct colonial rupture of 1707. Scotland in 1689 was still sovereign, its crown still distinct, visibly, demonstrably, institutionally, and constitutionally so.
Second: 1702. Queen Anne reaffirmed the existence of a distinct Scottish Crown beyond any constitutional doubt. Sara Salyers has established the full constitutional significance of this moment with most precision (Salyers, "Fictional Kingdom, Fraudulent State," Yours for Scotland, 2024). On 8 March 1702, at St James's Palace, Anne took and signed the Scottish Coronation Oath in the presence of members of the Scottish Privy Council, explicitly referencing the Claim of Right and swearing: "the Rights and Rents, with all just privileges of the Crown of Scotland, I shall preserve and keep inviolate, neither shall I transfer nor alienate the same." A separate Crown still existed; distinct from the Crown of England, operating under distinct constitutional principles, representing a distinct sovereign people. A separate oath was still required precisely because the Crown of Scotland was not the Crown of England and had never become the Crown of England. Alienation of that Crown; its transfer or absorption into another constitutional order, its fusion with the Crown of England; was explicitly and legally renounced by the monarch herself. As Salyers establishes, because the oath is stipulated in the Claim of Right Act and ratified as a condition of the Union itself, it continues to be "required by law" for any legitimate monarch of Scots; meaning no monarch had or has the authority to alter, fuse, or extinguish the Scottish Crown in which the sovereign rights of the people are vested. In 1702, ninety-nine years after 1603, the Crown of Scotland remained a distinct juridical and constitutional object, unmerged with the Crown of England, whose alienation was renounced under oath. The claim that the two crowns became one in 1603 collapses entirely on this evidence alone.
Third: the structural proof. As the Angry Pict's historical analysis establishes, if the two crowns had really fused into one in 1603, and if Scotland and England had really become one nation as a result, England would not have needed to abolish Scotland's Parliament in 1707 (Angry Pict, 2026). A state does not abolish institutions that no longer possess sovereign existence. The destruction of the Parliament of Scotland in 1707 constitutes the clearest possible historical admission that Scotland remained constitutionally distinct, with its own sovereign Parliament, its own crown, its own people's sovereignty; throughout the century following 1603. One does not extinguish what has already disappeared. The Parliament was abolished in 1707 because it still existed, still represented Scotland's sovereign people, and still constituted the institutional expression of a constitutional order, headed by a distinct Scottish Crown, that the English colonial state required to eliminate. That tells you everything.
Fourth: 1707. Then in 1706-1707, a separate and entirely distinct event occurred; the Treaty of Union negotiated and agreed in 1706, enacted through the Acts of Union passed by the Scottish Parliament in January 1707 and the English Parliament in March 1707, coming into force on 1 May 1707. This is the event, not 1603, on which the English colonial state has based its entire constitutional claim over Scotland, as its own SP Paper 1030 submission openly acknowledges: "The United Kingdom's constitutional arrangements are founded on the Treaty of Union, agreed in 1706 and enacted through the Acts of Union in 1707." Correct. Everything rests on 1707. Not 1603. Not the personal union. Not the shared monarch. Not any supposed fusion of crowns. 1707. It is therefore the 1706-1707 Treaty and Acts that must answer to intertemporal international law, procured through what Professor Robert Black KC and Liberation Scotland have established involved economic coercion, military intimidation then invasion, and the systematic bribery of the Scottish Parliament, vitiating the consent on which any legitimate treaty depends, and rendering it legally void ab initio under both customary international law operative at the time and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 49 and 52.
What 1707 produced was not the resolution of the constitutional incompatibility between the two crowns; an incompatibility whose precise nature Salyers has documented with unmatched analytical depth and whose historical trajectory the Angry Pict has traced with rigorous precision. It was its colonial suppression. The two crowns remained, and remain until today, two crowns. The two constitutional orders remained and remain two constitutional orders: one occupied, one dominant. Scotland's Crown was not merged with England's Crown in 1707. It was subordinated; illegally, unconstitutionally, by force and deceit, and in continuing breach of Scotland's foundational constitutional law; by the colonial extension of the English Crown's sovereignty northward. The annexation happened in 1707. The colonisation continues. The two crowns, the two sovereignties, the two kingdoms are still there. One still occupied by the English colonial state whose foundational constitutional claim rests on a treaty procured through coercion and bribery, legally void ab initio, and now formally before the Secretary-General of the United Nations and several UN bodies and experts.
There Is No "King of Scots"; Because There Is No King Who Has Accepted Scottish Sovereignty
Here is the constitutional fact the propaganda machine most urgently requires you not to know. Charles III is not, in any constitutionally meaningful sense, King of Scots. Based on Scotland's historic constitutional tradition grounded in popular sovereignty, conditional kingship, and the contractual nature of the Crown, the position of Charles III within Scotland raises unresolved constitutional contradictions that the post-1707 British constitutional order has never fully reconciled. The Crown of Scotland historically constitutes a distinct constitutional entity in which sovereignty resides ultimately in the people of Scotland; not in the monarch personally, and not in the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy later imposed from Westminster.
In Scotland, the Crown is not sovereign. The people are. This is not a slogan (a Gaelic word by the way). It is the foundational constitutional principle of Scottish law, established by the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) (Barrow, 2005), reaffirmed by the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton (1328), and definitionally established by the Claim of Right Act (1689) (MacQueen, 1996), which made explicit that the Scottish Crown is conditional, contractual, and revocable. The monarch holds the Scottish Crown not by inheritance or divine right but by the consent of the sovereign Scottish people, expressed through the Claim of Right's constitutional conditions. Break those conditions, as James VII did, and the Crown is forfeit. This is not theory since it happened. Scotland removed its monarch constitutionally in 1689 under its own distinct constitutional logic that England did not possess and had to disguise as a "Glorious Revolution" to achieve the same outcome through a military coup.
The Crown of Scotland is not His Majesty King Charles III. The Crown of Scotland is the people. To become King of Scots in the constitutionally meaningful sense, Charles III would need to accept that the sovereign Scottish people are above him; that he rules in Scotland by their consent, under their conditions, subject to their removal if those conditions are breached. He would need to take the full Scottish Coronation Oath, affirming the sovereignty of the Scottish people over the Crown. He has not done this. He took a Church of Scotland oath, a religious affirmation, but not the constitutional oath that would make him answerable to Scotland's sovereign people. As Sara Salyers establishes, Charles III is required to honour and uphold the Claim of Right as it protects the people of Scotland from the tyranny of an English constitution, or he cannot, legally, become King of Scots (Salyers, "The Claim of Right," Salvo).
What exists instead is the English Crown illegally extended to Scotland; the Crown whose sovereignty is vested in the monarch and Parliament, applied to a territory where sovereignty is constitutionally vested in the people. As the 1820 Society's constitutional analysis establishes: "There is no British throne, only an English throne with a borrowed Scottish crown." The two crowns are constitutionally irreconcilable; one is sovereign through the Crown-in-Parliament doctrine, answerable to no authority beyond Parliament itself; the other is conditional, contractual, and revocable, held in trust by the monarch on behalf of the sovereign Scottish people to whom the monarch is ultimately answerable. The English colonial state has resolved this irreconcilability not through legitimate constitutional merger but through the suppression of Scotland's constitutional tradition and the illegal extension of the English Crown's sovereignty over Scottish territory. This is why, as research by Alex Thorburn establishes, extending just the one UK Crown Office to Scotland would run the risk of constitutional challenge; because extending the English Crown to Scotland is impossible, as sovereignty in Scotland through the Scottish Crown is the people, and is totally incompatible with English sovereignty.
As Sara Salyers establishes, the incompatibility of the two constitutional traditions (the English Crown sovereign through the Crown-in-Parliament doctrine, the Scottish Crown conditional and held in trust by the people) was never resolved at the Treaty of Union. Instead, the two nations agreed to retain their distinct constitutions, with the Claim of Right Act 1689 guaranteed as a condition of the Union itself through its naming in the Preservation of the Presbyterian Faith Act 1706, ratified by both parliaments. The imposed sovereignty of Westminster Parliament on Scotland's people therefore does not and never has corresponded with Scotland's constitutional rights. It constitutes a continuing breach of the treaty's own conditions (Salyers, "The Claim of Right," Salvo; Salyers, "The Treaty Bites Back," Salvo).
This is why there are two separate Crown Estate offices and Scotland has a distinct Scottish Coronation Oath. This is why the constitutional incompatibility between the two crowns could never be resolved by the personal union of 1603 and required instead the colonial suppression of 1707. The two crowns were not united in 1603. The Scottish Crown was subordinated illegally, unconstitutionally, and in continuing breach of Scotland's foundational constitutional law, by the colonial extension of the English Crown's sovereignty northward. Two crowns. Two sovereignties. One colonised. One colonising. Scotland is indeed an English colony.
The Special Case: "Actually, Scotland Annexed England"
And here the propagandists reveal themselves completely. When the standard argument fails, as it always does under minimal scrutiny, some deploy a breathtaking inversion of their own logic, claiming that because a Scottish king took the English throne, it was actually Scotland that absorbed England; that Scotland's crown swallowed England's crown, that Scotland is the aggressor, the annexer, the imperial power in the relationship. This is colonial gaslighting of the most audacious kind; the colonised people recast as the coloniser, the annexed nation recast as the annexer, the victim of three centuries of colonial violence, resource extraction, cultural suppression, and constitutional subordination recast as the perpetrator.
Anti-colonial theorists have long identified this inversion as a recurring feature of colonial ideology itself: domination presented as benevolence and resistance represented as aggression. The colonised are transformed rhetorically into the source of instability created by colonial power. The suggestion that Scotland annexed England because a Scottish monarch inherited the English throne belongs recognisably to this wider colonial structure of inversion.
Apply the logic honestly. James was Scottish. He moved his court to London. Scotland's Parliament remained in Edinburgh. Scotland's Crown remained Scotland's Crown; distinct, conditional, sovereign. Scotland's resources began flowing south immediately. Scotland's political influence over its own affairs diminished continuously from 1603 onward. If a Scottish king on the English throne constitutes Scotland's crown absorbing England's crown and Scotland annexing England, one must explain why the annexed party, England, ended up with the monarch, the capital, the treasury, the military, the empire, the colonies (Scotland has never had a colonial empire as said before), the financial institutions, the trade networks, and the political power, while the annexing party, Scotland, ended up with ethnic cleansing, enslavement, deportation, genocide, asset stripping, the McCrone Report suppressed for thirty years, its oil revenues redirected to London, its ports underinvested, its trade intercepted, its industrial base dismantled, its Gaelic and Scots languages suppressed, and its Parliament denied the right to legislate for its own constitutional future.
That is a peculiar annexation. The most resource-rich annexer in European history, somehow ending up with none of its own resources. The most powerful aggressor on the continent, somehow requiring Westminster's permission to hold an advisory referendum on its own future. Extraordinary.
When Philip II of Spain held both the Spanish and Portuguese thrones from 1580, nobody argued that Portugal's crown had absorbed Spain's or that Portugal had annexed Spain; even though Philip was of Portuguese royal descent through his mother. When Cnut held England, Denmark, and Norway, nobody argued that Norway's crown had absorbed England's or that Norway had annexed England. When the Habsburgs held Spain and Austria simultaneously, nobody argued that the Netherlands' crown had absorbed Sicily's. The argument that the smaller, poorer, more peripheral nation's crown absorbed the larger, wealthier, dominant, more powerful one is deployed exclusively against Scotland, which tells you everything about the argument's colonial function and nothing about European constitutional history.
This is what Fanon identifies as the colonial inversion; the systematic rewriting of colonial domination as its opposite, the transformation of the colonised people's dispossession into evidence of their aggression (Fanon, 1961). Memmi calls it the coloniser's portrait of the colonised: the oppressor casting himself as the victim of the people he oppresses (Memmi, 1957). The argument proves too much in every direction except the one that serves English colonial domination; in which direction, conveniently, it proves exactly enough.
What This Argument Is Really Doing
What happens when the colonial constitutional argument is pressed to its logical conclusion? Angry Pict documented a revealing exchange on X in which precisely this question was put, repeatedly and directly, to the Director of Civitas Schools, formerly of Debating Matters, an institution embedded within the 55 Tufton Street ecosystem of right-wing think tanks with a direct institutional interest in the constitutional legitimacy of the British state (Angry Pict, X, 2026). The question posed was simple and unanswerable: did 1707 lawfully and consensually extinguish Scotland's separate constitutional order; its separate crown, its separate sovereignty, its separate people?
It was never answered. What the exchange produced instead was a textbook demonstration of colonial epistemic violence; the systematic suppression of the colonised people's constitutional framework not through engagement but through bad faith, deflection, smear, and the deployment of the colonial intellectual apparatus in the service of containment (Spivak, 1988; Gramsci, 1971). This is an attempt to blur the argument using 1603; precisely the displacement we analyse here; pathologisation of the constitutional argument and a "blood and soil" smear that had to be partially retracted; repeated reframing of constitutional evidence as irrelevant antiquarianism, despite the UK Government grounding its own authority in 1707; the hollow claim that the parties "just disagree" to avoid evidence-led debate; and finally, when all else failed, a concession that Scotland's Parliament ceased while England's continued; explained away by reference to English wealth and power.
Asked why one Parliament persisted and the other ceased in 1707, the Civitas director's answer was: "England was bigger, wealthier and more powerful."
That is not a constitutional argument but a description of annexation. It is the colonial position's most honest self-revelation; produced not by a Liberation Scotland analysis but by one of the colonial intellectual infrastructure's own professional defenders, under sustained constitutional questioning, after every other containment move had failed. Might as right. Power as legitimacy. The colonial answer, stripped of its ideological cover.
Angry Pict identified the precise rhetorical technique being deployed throughout the exchange; not merely bad faith but a specific psychological operation: normalisation through assertion, sometimes called the "dead cat" technique. Stating the existing colonial arrangement as self-evident fact requiring no justification, as if its existence is itself the argument. It makes the person questioning the arrangement feel as though they are denying an obvious reality rather than interrogating its legitimacy. The status quo appears inevitable. The constitutional challenge appears delusional. As Angry Pict noted of the Civitas director: "All of her comments are considered and calibrated; there's nothing accidental in there. Very little is honest debate, it's all calibrated to have specific forms and reactions. What some people call psychological warfare" (Angry Pict, X, 2026). This is the colonial intellectual infrastructure not engaging with Scotland's constitutional reality but managing it; deploying calibrated psychological technique against anyone who questions the legitimacy of the colonial arrangement. It is colonial containment dressed as debate.
The question remains unanswered. It always does. Because the orthodox position has no answer to it. And as Angry Pict concludes: once exposed on this question, all the colonial state has are legal loopholes and procedural tricks. Its legitimacy, examined honestly, is gone (Angry Pict, X, 2026).
The "union of crowns" propaganda talking point is not history. It is the English colonial state's foundational myth performing its most basic function: making the false claim that Scotland's Crown merged with England's Crown in 1603, and thereby making Scotland's colonisation appear as Scotland's voluntary constitutional self-dissolution and the restoration of Scotland's independence appear as the invention of something new rather than the recovery of something stolen. The colonised people's assertion of their inalienable rights appear as a contradiction of historical fact. In this sense, the "union of crowns" narrative functions less as historical explanation than as hegemonic common sense, a legitimating mythology so deeply normalised that the political coercion and constitutional suppression sustaining it disappear from view (Gramsci, 1971).
As the Angry Pict's constitutional analysis concludes, the myth performs a deeper function by relocating union to 1603; hiding the incompatibility of the two crowns themselves, hiding the fact that they were never fused, allowing English constitutional logic to appear neutral and inevitable. The Scottish Crown and its constitutional order did not fade away. They were extinguished and suppressed; in 1707, not 1603. That is not union but absorption and annexation. It is colonisation (Angry Pict, 2026).
The Real Consequence: Once 1603 Is Demolished, Everything Moves to 1707. That Is Where the English Colonial State Is Most Vulnerable
This is why the "union of crowns" myth matters beyond historical pedantry. It is not merely a factual error about what happened to two crowns in 1603. It is a strategic displacement; a colonial sleight of hand designed to move constitutional scrutiny away from 1707, where the English colonial state is fatally exposed, and anchor it instead in 1603, where the personal union's apparent naturalness (one man, two crowns) makes Scotland's subsequent colonial absorption appear inevitable and consensual rather than coerced and legally void.
Once the 1603 myth is demolished the entire constitutional question moves to where it always belonged: 1706 and 1707. The Treaty and Acts of Union. The actual event. The colonial annexation. The one the English colonial state most urgently requires to appear legitimate.
And at 1707, the English colonial state faces a problem it cannot resolve within its own constitutional framework. Because 1707 is where the coercion is documented and the bribery of the Scottish Parliament is documented; Lord Seafield's "end of an auld sang”, the systematic payments to Scottish parliamentarians recorded in the Equivalent, the economic coercion of the Alien Act 1705 which threatened to treat Scottish subjects as aliens and seize Scottish assets in England unless Scotland accepted union on English terms. It is where Professor Robert Black KC and Liberation Scotland have established that the consent required for a valid treaty was vitiated; making the 1707 Acts legally void ab initio under both customary international law operative at the time and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 49 and 52, which codify the pre-existing customary law on coercion and therefore apply retrospectively under the principle of intertemporal law.
Intertemporal law is the principle that the legal validity of an act must be assessed not only by the law in force at the time of the act but also by the development of international law over time; a principle established by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Island of Palmas case (1928) (PCIJ, 1928) and developed through subsequent international jurisprudence.
The English colonial state's violation of the 1706-1707 Treaty, an international treaty subject to international law, was not merely a retrospective legal finding. It was acknowledged within two years of the Union's enactment by one of its own principal architects. Robert Harley; former Speaker of the English House of Commons, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, chief minister to Queen Anne, principal strategist of the Union settlement, and subsequently Lord High Treasurer of Great Britain; was recorded as stating shortly after the Union's enactment:
"Foreigners say publicly, I mean our own allies, that we are a perfidious nation; and since we have violated our treaty with Scotland, and laugh at the notion of fundamental and inviolable articles, there is no great wonder if we treat other nations as we do."
The man who built the Union declared it violated before the ink was dry. The statement is extraordinary not merely because of its content but because of its source; one of the principal architects of the Union settlement acknowledging, within two years of its enactment, that England stood accused internationally of violating the treaty itself. The Anglo-British colonial state's contemporary insistence upon the unquestionable legitimacy of the Union therefore collides directly with the historical testimony of its own founding political elite.
The colonial state that today insists the Treaty is the unimpeachable foundation of its constitutional authority over Scotland is the same state whose own chief minister confirmed its violation within two years. This is not a decolonial argument imposed retrospectively on historical events. It is the English colonial state convicting itself, in its own words, in its own time, through its own most powerful voice.
The English colonial state has based its entire constitutional claim over Scotland on the 1706-1707 Treaty and Acts of Union. It must therefore face the full force of intertemporal international law's assessment of those acts: their procurement through coercion, the absence of genuine consent, their legal voidness ab initio, and the continuing internationally wrongful act that their enforcement constitutes under Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) Article 14.
The UK Government's own submission to the Scottish Parliament's Constitution, Europe, External Affairs, and Culture Committee inquiry into independence referendum options states this openly, without apparent awareness of what it concedes: "The United Kingdom's constitutional arrangements are founded on the Treaty of Union, agreed in 1706 and enacted through the Acts of Union in 1707." Correct. Everything rests on 1707. Not 1603. Not the personal union. Not the shared monarch. Not any supposed fusion of two crowns into one. 1707. The submission continues: "The sovereignty of the UK Parliament remains the cornerstone of our constitution." This is the English constitutional doctrine; the sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament, in which ultimate authority is vested in monarch, Lords, and Commons acting together, answerable to no authority beyond themselves; applied to Scotland, where the constitutional doctrine is the sovereignty of the people, not of Parliament, and where the Crown is not sovereign in itself or through Parliament but conditional, contractual, and held in trust by the sovereign Scottish people to whom it is ultimately answerable. The English colonial state is openly stating that it has resolved the irreconcilable incompatibility between the two constitutional traditions, identified with such precision by the Angry Pict's and Sara Salyers's analyses, by simply imposing the English doctrine on Scottish territory and calling it the UK constitution. This is not constitutional resolution. It is colonial imposition.
This is the colonial constitutional cage stating itself as fact. The constitutional architecture of the Union indeed increasingly resembles what anti-colonial theory would recognise as a colonial cage; a structure permitting limited administrative autonomy, symbolic national expression, and devolved institutional management while withholding the sovereign authority necessary for the colonised nation to determine independently its own constitutional future. Scotland may administer certain domestic affairs, celebrate national identity, organise symbolic events and maintain subordinate institutions, yet the ultimate constitutional question; whether Scotland may freely determine its own political status; remains reserved to the authority of the administering power itself. This is not the resolution of the constitutional contradiction. It is its colonial management. It rests entirely on 1707, which means it rests entirely on an international treaty between two sovereign states procured through coercion and bribery, legally void ab initio, whose enforcement constitutes a continuing internationally wrongful act now formally before the Secretary-General of the United Nations through document UN Human Rights Council A/HRC/61/NGO/210.
The propagandists who invoke 1603, claiming falsely that the two crowns became one, and thereby that two nations became one, are doing the English colonial state's most important constitutional service, keeping scrutiny away from 1707, where the entire colonial edifice is built on foundations that intertemporal international law establishes as legally void. Scotland's liberation movement and the international community have already started fixing their gaze firmly on 1707 rather than 1603. The colonial state's constitutional position will collapse under that gaze. Not only politically. Legally. Under the same international law that the UK invokes for every other constitutional question it wishes the world to take seriously.
Evacuate 1603. It was never a union of crowns in the sense of two crowns becoming one. It was a personal union (one man wearing two entirely separate crowns) like dozens of others in European history, none of which merged the crowns involved, none of which merged the nations involved. The two crowns remained two crowns. They remain two crowns today. Move to 1707. That is where the annexation happened. That is where the coercion is documented. That is where intertemporal law applies and where the English colonial state is most vulnerable, which is precisely why it needs the 1603 myth to persist; and why it needs also, for example, the Darien myth alongside it. The claim that Scotland was bankrupted by the Darien scheme and voluntarily entered the Union to be rescued by English wealth is the 1603 myth's necessary companion: together they construct a narrative of Scottish consent that conceals colonial annexation. Both are colonial disinformation. We will probably also demolish Darien in the future, which others have done well already. The scheme's failure was partly the product of English colonial sabotage, Scotland was not bankrupt but resource-rich, and 1707 was not Scotland's economic rescue but England's annexation of a nation whose resources it required and has extracted ever since.
Scotland and England Shared a King. Their Crowns Never Merged. Their Nations Never United.
It fails on every available historical, legal, constitutional, and logical test. It is contradicted by every comparable personal union in European history without exception (by Cnut's North Sea empire, by the Habsburg continental dominion, by the Iberian Union, by the Polish-Swedish personal union, by the Anglo-Dutch personal union). In every single comparable case, the shared monarch changed nothing about the distinct crowns, distinct national identities, distinct sovereign traditions, and distinct constitutional realities of the nations involved. Scotland is not the exception to this rule. Scotland is the confirmation of it.
Scotland was not merged with England in 1603. Scotland's Crown was not fused with England's Crown in 1603. Scotland was not legitimately united with England in 1707. Scotland is a colonised nation whose inalienable right to self-determination is now formally before the Secretary-General of the United Nations through document UN Human Rights Council A/HRC/61/NGO/210.
To repeat things almost like an English colonial propaganda bot, not quite though:
England, Denmark, and Norway shared a king under Cnut. Their crowns remained distinct. They remained England, Denmark, and Norway.
Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands shared a king under Charles V. Their crowns remained distinct. They remained Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands.
Poland and Sweden shared a king under Sigismund III. Their crowns remained distinct. They remained Poland and Swedenand then fought each other for a century.
England and the Netherlands shared a king under William III. Their crowns remained distinct. They remained England and the Netherlands.
Portugal and Spain shared a king for sixty years. Portugal's Crown remained distinct. Portugal remained Portugal.
Scotland and England shared a king from 1603. Scotland's Crown remained distinct; conditional, contractual, held in trust by the sovereign Scottish people. Scotland remained Scotland. Until 1707. When the annexation happened. And even then, two crowns, two sovereignties, two kingdoms; one colonised, one colonising.
In every comparable European case, personal union altered dynastic succession without fusing the crowns involved and without extinguishing the distinct constitutional existence of the nations involved. Shared monarchy did not dissolve sovereignty, merge crowns, erase national identity, abolish constitutional systems, or retroactively transform independent kingdoms into regional extensions of another state. Scotland is not the exception to this historical pattern. Scotland is its clearest confirmation.
A shared king did not make one crown. Two crowns did not make one nation. It never did. Anywhere. In the entire history of European monarchy. The propaganda machine knows this, which is why it applies the argument exclusively to Scotland, exclusively in the direction that serves English colonial domination, and exclusively when it needs Scotland to disappear.
Scotland and Scotland's Crown have not disappeared. Scotland's self-determination claim is formally before the Secretary-General of the United Nations and several UN bodies, notably for decolonisation. The "union of crowns" argument deployed by bots, by unionists, by the colonial media, by everyone whose interest requires Scotland's colonial condition to appear as Scotland's natural and chosen state is not history.
The persistence of the myth despite overwhelming comparative historical evidence reveals its true function. It survives not because it explains history convincingly but because it performs an indispensable legitimating role for the constitutional order colonially imposed in 1707.
It is the sound the colonial cage makes when Scotland rattles it.
References
Alien Act 1705. Union of England and Scotland Act 1704, 3 & 4 Ann. c. 6. Parliament of England.
Allmand, Christopher. The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c.1300-c.1450. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Angry Pict. "Constitutional Exchange on Scotland's 1707 Settlement." X (formerly Twitter), 2026. Available at: https://x.com/SymbolStones/status/2056645907471286784
Angry Pict. "Normalisation Through Assertion: The Civitas Exchange." X (formerly Twitter), 2026. Available at: https://x.com/SymbolStones/status/2056676980414701708
Angry Pict. "There Was No Union of Crowns: How Scotland Lost Its Constitutional Monarchy." Angry Pict (Substack), 16 February 2026. Available at: https://angrypict.substack.com/p/there-was-no-union-of-crowns-how
Barrow, G.W.S. Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland. 4th edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.
Bolton, Timothy. Cnut the Great. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
Caldwell, D. (1998) Scotland's Wars and Warriors. Edinburgh: The Stationery Office.
Claim of Right Act 1689. Parliament of Scotland.
Davies, Norman. God's Playground: A History of Poland. Vol. 1. Revised edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Declaration of Arbroath. 1320. National Records of Scotland. Available at: https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/research/learning/declaration-of-arbroath
DeVries, K. (1999) Joan of Arc: A Military Leader. Stroud: Sutton Publishing.
Disney, A.R. A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Elliott, J.H. Imperial Spain 1469-1716. 2nd edition. London: Penguin Books, 2002.
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Paris: François Maspero, 1961. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press, 2004.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
Harley, Robert, 1st Earl of Oxford. Statement, c.1709. Cited in: Lawson, Iain. "Welcome to Britain, Land of the Broken Treaties." Yours for Scotland, 15 October 2021. Available at: https://yoursforscotlandcom.wordpress.com/2021/10/15/welcome-to-the-uk-land-of-the-broken-treaties/
International Law Commission. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). UN Doc. A/56/10. New York: United Nations, 2001.
Israel, Jonathan I. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
MacCormick v Lord Advocate. 1953 SC 396. Scotland: Court of Session.
MacQueen, H.L., ed. Scots Law into the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of W.A. Wilson. Edinburgh: W. Green & Son, 1996.
Mason, Roger A., ed. Scotland and England 1286-1815. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1987.
Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized. Paris: Éditions Buchet-Chastel, 1957. Translated by Howard Greenfeld. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.
Nicholson, R. (1974) Scotland: The Later Middle Ages. Edinburgh History of Scotland, vol. 2. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd.
Permanent Court of International Justice. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States of America). Award of 4 April 1928. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, pp. 829-871.
Salyers, Sara. "The Claim of Right." Salvo. Available at: https://salvo.scot/the-claim-of-right/
Salyers, Sara. "In Right of the Crown." Salvo. Available at: https://salvo.scot/in-right-of-the-crown/
Salyers, Sara. "Fictional Kingdom, Fraudulent State." Yours for Scotland, 1 June 2024. Available at: https://yoursforscotlandcom.wordpress.com/2024/06/01/fictional-kingdom-fraudulent-state/
Salyers, Sara. "The Treaty Bites Back: A 'Forgotten' Constitution, Scotland's Claim of Right." Salvo / Yours for Scotland, March 2022. Available at: https://yoursforscotlandcom.wordpress.com/2022/03/29/sara-salyers-paper-in-full/
Simms, Brendan, and Torsten Riotte, eds. The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714-1837. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988.
The 1820 Society. "The Historical Inquiry: Are You the King of Scots, Your Majesty?" 19 August 2025. Available at: https://1820society.org/blog-post2
Thorburn, Alex (Scottish National Congress). "Why Charles Windsor Has No Regnal Title." Yours for Scotland, 10 February 2024. Available at: https://yoursforscotlandcom.wordpress.com/2024/02/10/why-charles-windsor-has-no-regnal-title/
Thrush, Andrew. "On This Day: 21 November 1606: The Proposed Union Between England and Scotland." History of Parliament Online, 2014. Available at: https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/periods/stuarts/day-21-november-1606-proposed-union-between-england-and-scotland
UK Government. Submission to the Scottish Parliament Constitution, Europe, External Affairs, and Culture Committee Inquiry into Options for a Legal Mechanism for Triggering Any Independence Referendum. SP Paper 1030. February 2026.
UN General Assembly. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Resolution 1514 (XV). 14 December 1960.
United Nations Human Rights Council. Document A/HRC/61/NGO/210. Submitted by IPLSA and Liberation Scotland. 61st Session, 2026.
Vale, M. (1974) Charles VII. London: Methuen.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331.
Member discussion